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Claim Preclusion – Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); 
Simon v. FIA Card Services, North America, 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 
2013) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “the Bankruptcy Code precludes 
FDCPA claims arising from communications to a debtor sent in the 
bankruptcy context.”  Id. at 271.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit 
took a “broad approach, holding that a debt collector’s communications 
to a consumer debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding cannot be the 
basis of a FDCPA claim,” while the 2nd Circuit reached a similar result 
on the issue without taking a “broad analytical approach.”  Id. at 271–73.  
The court also noted that the 7th Circuit assessed whether there is an 
“irreconcilable conflict between the [FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code] 
or a clearly expressed legislative decision that one replace the other.”  Id. 
at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 3rd Circuit agreed with 
the 7th Circuit in finding that the proper inquiry is “whether the FDCPA 
claim raises a direct conflict between the Code or Rules and the FDCPA, 
or whether both can be enforced.”  Id. at 274.  Thus, the 3rd Circuit held 
that when “FDCPA claims arise from communications a debt collector 
sends a bankruptcy debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding” 
regardless of whether the “communications are alleged to violate the 
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, there is no categorical preclusion of the 
FDCPA claims.”  Id. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Forum Selection Clause – Interpretation and Enforceability; 
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether a federal court sitting in 
diversity should apply federal or state law to determine the enforceability 
of a forum selection clause designating a domestic forum . . . .”  Id. at 
222.  The 2nd Circuit noted that the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 10th Circuits have 
“applied federal law . . . to decide the [forum selection] clause’s 
enforceability.”  Id.  The 2nd Circuit, however, opined that there was not 
“as clear a prevailing approach on the question of what law governs the 
interpretation of forum selection clauses.”  Id.  The 2nd Circuit noted 
that the 4th Circuit had “applied the body of law identified in a choice-
of-law clause . . . to an interpretive question raised by the forum selection 
clause” and thereafter assessed the clause’s enforceability under federal 
law.  Id. at 223.  The court disagreed with the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 10th 
Circuits because “[these] courts tend[ed] to blur the distinction between 
enforceability and interpretation.”  Id. at 222.  The 2nd Circuit agreed 
with the 4th Circuit in finding there was no reason “to prevent a court 
from first interpreting the forum selection clause under the law selected 
by the contracting parties . . . before turning to federal law to determine 
whether the clause should be enforced.”  Id.  Thus, the 2nd Circuit 
concluded that although questions of enforceability should be resolved 
under federal law, interpretative questions concerning the forum 
selection clause should be resolved under the law designated by that 
contractual choice-of-law clause.  Id. at 224. 
Standard of Review – Intentional Discrimination; S.H. v. Lower 
Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether the court should apply the 
discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference standard in cases of 
claims of compensatory damages for intentional discrimination under 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and § 202 of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).  Id. at 262.  The court noted that the 2nd, 8th, 
9th, 10th and 11th Circuits have “generally applied a two-part standard 
for deliberate indifference, requiring both (1) knowledge that a harm to a 
federally protected right is substantially likely,’ and (2) ‘a failure to act 
upon that likelihood,” while the 1st and 5th Circuits have held that 
“plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages must demonstrate a higher 
showing of intentional discrimination than deliberate indifference, such 
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as discriminatory animus” in which a plaintiff must show “prejudice, 
spite or ill will.”  Id. at 263.  The court agreed with the 2nd, 8th, 9th, 
10th and 11th Circuits, asserting that the “standard of deliberate 
indifference, rather than one that targets animus, will give meaning to the 
RA’s and the ADA’s purpose to end systematic neglect.”  Id. at 264.  
The court agreed with the reasoning that “a lower standard would fail to 
provide the notice-and-opportunity requirements to RA defendants, while 
a higher standard—requiring discriminatory animus—would run counter 
to congressional intent as it would inhibit §504’s ability to reach 
knowing discrimination in the absence of animus.”  Id. at 265 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 3rd Circuit joined the 2nd, 8th, 9th, 
10th and 11th Circuits in holding that “a showing of deliberate 
indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory damages under § 504 
of the RA and § 202 of the ADA.”  Id. at 263. 
The Finality Requirement – Conditional Dismissal; Page Plus of 
Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2013) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “a party’s conditional dismissal 
of unresolved claims, in which the party reserves the right to reinstate 
those claims if the case returns to the district court after an appeal of the 
resolved claims, create[s] a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Id. at 
659.  The court noted that the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits determined 
“that a conditional dismissal does not meet § 1291’s finality 
requirement,” while the 2nd Circuit determined that the possibility of 
finality was sufficient to establish finality.  Id. at 662.  The 6th Circuit 
agreed with the 7th Circuit finding that “finality either exists at the time 
an appellate court decides the appeal or it does not.”  Id.  Thus, the 6th 
Circuit joined the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits in holding that the 
conditional dismissal of unresolved claims does not create a final order 
under § 1291.  Id. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 68 – Unaccepted Settlement Offers; Diaz v. First 
American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2013) 
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer 
that would have fully satisfied a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to render 
the claim moot.”  Id. at 952.  The court noted that the 7th Circuit has held 
“that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer for complete relief will moot a 
plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff outright.”  Id.  The court noted that the 
6th Circuit has held that that an offer of judgment that satisfies a 
plaintiff’s entire demand moots the case . . . [but the court] should enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the defendants’ 
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Rule 68 offer of judgment.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
contrast, the court noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that “an unaccepted 
Rule 68 offer from complete relief [does not] moot[] a plaintiff’s 
claim . . . . but [the 2nd Circuit] agrees with the [6th] Circuit that when 
such an offer has been made, the better resolution is to enter judgment 
against the defendant.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 9th 
Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit finding that the court was 
“consistent with the language structure and purposes of Rule 68 and 
with fundamental principles governing mootness.  Id. at 955.  Thus, the 
9th Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit in holding “that an unaccepted Rule 68 
offer that would fully satisfy a plaintiff’s claim is insufficient to render 




Civil Rights – Freedom of Religion; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a for-profit corporation is a 
“person” capable of “religious exercise” as intended by the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  Id. at 625.  The court noted that the 
10th Circuit determined that for-profit corporations were not excluded 
from RFRA’s protection, while the 3rd Circuit found that because a for-
profit corporation is incapable of exercising religion, it cannot assert a 
claim under RFRA.  Id.  The court agreed with the 3rd Circuit in finding 
that when Congress enacted RFRA, its express purpose was 
fundamentally personal and did not include “corporations primarily 
organized for secular, profit-seeking purposes.”  Id. at 626.  The court 
disagreed with the 10th Circuit as reading the term “person” in such a 
way that “would lead to a significant expansion of the scope of the rights 
the Free Exercise Clause protected” when RFRA was passed.  Id.  Thus, 
the 6th Circuit concluded that a for-profit corporation “is not a ‘person’ 
capable of ‘religious exercise’ as intended by RFRA.”  Id. at 625. 
Eighth Amendment – Consent Defense; Graham v. Sheriff of Logan 
County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “consent is a defense to an 
Eighth Amendment claim based on sexual acts” between a prisoner and 
the prisoner’s custodians or guards.  Id. at 1125.  The court noted that the 
6th and 8th Circuits have held that sexual intercourse between guards 
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and inmates that is consensual and voluntary “does not rise to the level of 
an Eighth Amendment violation.”  Id. at 1124.  In contrast, the 9th 
Circuit adopted a “middle ground” approach by creating a “rebuttable 
presumption of nonconsent,” whereby “[t]he state official can rebut the 
presumption by showing that the sexual interaction involved no coercive 
factors.”  Id. at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
“agree[d] with the 9th Circuit’s reasoning that “the power dynamics 
between prisoners and guards make[s] it difficult to discern consent from 
coercion” but declined to adopt the same rebuttable presumption.  Id. at 
1126.  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that sexual abuse of prisoners 
should be treated as a “species of excessive-force claim, requiring at least 
some form of coercion (not necessarily physical) by the prisoner’s 




Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title II – Employment 
Discrimination; Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 
2013) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether Title II of the . . . [ADA] 
cover[s] employment related disability discrimination.”  Id. at 622.  The 
court noted that the 9th and 10th Circuits have held that Title II does not 
“appl[y] to disability discrimination in public employment . . . leaving 
Title I as the exclusive ADA remedy for claims of disability 
discrimination in both public and private employment,” while the 11th 
Circuit has “reached the opposite conclusion.”  Id.  The court agreed with 
the 9th and 10th Circuits reasoning that “employment-discrimination 
claims must proceed under Title I of the ADA, which addresses itself 
specifically to employment discrimination and, among other things 
requires the plaintiff to satisfy certain administrative preconditions to 
filing suit.”  Id. at 630.  The court disagreed with the 11th Circuit’s 
failure to “consider[] the specific definition of ‘qualified person with a 
disability’ found in Title II.  Id. at 629.  Thus, the 7th Circuit “join[ed] 
the [9th] and [10th] Circuits . . . in hold[ing] that Title II of the ADA 
does not cover disability-based employment discrimination.”  Id. at 630. 
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Affirmative Defenses – Concilation; EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 
F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether an alleged failure to engage in 
good faith conciliation creates an implied affirmative defense to the 
substantive merits of an employment discrimination lawsuit and, if so, 
what is the proper judicial standard of review for such a defense be.  Id. 
at 172.  The court noted that although six other circuits agree that there is 
“an implied affirmative defense of failure to conciliate,” there is a circuit 
split on the level of scrutiny that should be applied in reviewing the 
alleged conciliation.  Id. at 182–83.  The court noted that 2nd, 5th and 
11th Circuits utilize a three-part test, whereas the 4th, 6th and 10th 
Circuits “inquire into the good faith of the EEOC’s efforts.”  Id. at 183.  
The court was not persuaded to join either side of the circuit split.  Id. at 
182–83.  The court noted that the statute itself did not contain an express 
provision for an affirmative defense nor did it contain a standard of 
review that could be used by courts when evaluating the defense.  Id. at 
174.  The court reasoned that an applied affirmative defense would not 
“fit well with the broader statutory scheme of Title VII” because it 
encourages employers to use the conciliatory process to undermine Title 
VII instead of resolving the dispute.  Id. at 178–79.  Thus, the 7th Circuit 
held that “alleged failures by the EEOC in the conciliation process 
simply did not support an affirmative defense for employers charged 
with employment discrimination.”  Id. at 184. 
 
Religious Freedom – Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) 
ISSUE ONE; The 7th Circuit addressed “whether business owners 
and their closely held corporations may assert a religious objection to the 
[ACA] contraception mandate.”  Id. at 659.  The 7th Circuit noted that 
the 10th Circuit determined “that two closely held, for-profit businesses 
and their owners are likely to succeed on a claim for an exemption from 
the mandate under” the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 
while the 3rd and 6th Circuits found that although the owners of two 
closely-held, for-profit businesses are likely to succeed on a RFRA 
challenge to the mandate, their corporations—which arguably do not 
qualify as “persons” under the RFRA—are not.  Id. at 665 (emphasis 
added).  The 7th Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit finding that the 
RFRA does not actually define “person,” and that under the Dictionary 
Act, Congress’s use of the word “person” may generally be understood 
to include corporations.  Id. at 674.  Further, the court reasoned that there 
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was “nothing in the Supreme Court’s free-exercise jurisprudence” to 
foreclose a profit-seeking entity from making a RFRA claim.  Id. at 681.  
Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs—both the business 
owners and their companies—may challenge the mandate because 
“corporate plaintiffs are ‘persons’ under the RFRA and may invoke the 
statute’s protection.”  Id. at 666. 
ISSUE TWO; The 7th Circuit addressed “whether 
forcing . . . [business owners and their closely held corporations] to 
provide . . . [contraception] coverage substantially burdens their religious 
exercise rights.”  Id. at 659.  The court noted that the 10th Circuit held 
that religious exercise rights were substantially burdened by the 
contraception mandate, while the 3rd and 6th Circuits held that business 
owners and their closely held corporations “do not have viable claims 
against the contraception mandate because the mandate does not actually 
require them to do anything.”  Id. at 687.  The court agreed with the 10th 
Circuit’s reasoning “that the substantial-burden test under the RFRA 
focuses primarily on the intensity of the coercion applied by the 
government to act contrary to religious beliefs.”  Id. at 683 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   Thus, the 7th Circuit held that the 
contraception mandate imposes a substantial burden on the . . . religious 




Hague Convention – Article 12; Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2013) 
The 1st Circuit considered “[w]hether equitable tolling applies to 
the one-year period that triggers the availability of the ‘now settled’ 
defense under Article 12” of the Hague Convention (Convention).  Id.  at 
4.  The court noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that “Article 12’s one-
year period does not operate as a statute of limitations,” while the 9th and 
11th Circuits have “considered the one-year period to be a statue of 
limitations.”  Id. at 13, 15.  The court agreed with the 2nd Circuits 
reasoning that while “the text of Article 12 does not address equitable 
tolling explicitly . . . it does however, suggest that equitable tolling does 
not apply.”  Id. at 12.  The court reasoned that the 9th and 11th Circuits’ 
view that Article 12 imposes a “statute of limitations . . . because to 
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[hold] otherwise would be inconsistent with the Convention’s emphasis 
on prompt return . . . [contains] no textual support . . . .”  Id. at 13.  Thus, 
the 1st Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit in “hold[ing] that the Convention 
does not allow a federal district court to toll equitably the one-year 
period that must elapse before a parent can assert the ‘now settled’ 




Statutory Interpretation – Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act; Tobar-Barrera v. Holder, No. 11-1447, 
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22040 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013) 
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the term “actions taken” under 
§ 321(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) applied retroactively.  Id. at *8.  The court 
noted that the 3rd and 5th Circuits determined that “Congress intended 
that section 321(c) apply retroactively to all adjudications occurring on 
and after the date of enactment,” while the 6th Circuit determined that 
“the term ‘action taken’ . . . derives from the point at which the removal 
action begins for purposes of determining whether the pre- or post-
IIRIRA definition of aggravated felony applies.”  Id. at *8–9.  The 4th 
Circuit disagreed with the 3rd and 5th Circuits finding that “Congress did 
not say . . . that the amended definition would apply in all proceedings.”  
Id. at *10.  Thus, the 4th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit in holding 
that the amended definition was given limited retroactive application and 
would apply to “actions taken” on and after the date of enactment.  Id. at 
*11. 
Asylum Petition – Due Process; Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263 (9th 
Cir. 2013) 
The 9th Circuit considered whether an immigration judge violates 
an asylum petitioner’s due process by relying on a State Department 
letter summarizing the investigation of the asylum petitioner’s claim.  Id. 
at 1266.  The court noted that the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits have held 
it is unconstitutional for an immigration judge or the Bureau of 
Immigration Appeals to rely on a consular letter.  Id. at 1268.  The court 
noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that federal statutes prohibit reliance 
on consular letters in immigration appeals.  Id.  The court stated that in 
immigration cases “[f]raud, forgery and fabrication are so common–and 
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so difficult to prove–that they are routinely tolerated.”  Id. at 1269.  The 
court posited that the reliance on a consular letter would not violate the 
asylum petitioner’s due process, because “[w]here the petitioner has the 
burden of proof, there’s nothing unfair about having a U.S. government 
agent check out some of his basic facts and inform the [immigration 
judge] of possible discrepancies.”  Id. at 1275.  The court remarked that 
the permissive standards of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits, rather 
than “allow[ing] more of the world’s oppressed” to obtain asylum, do 
more to “favor[] the canny, the dishonest, the brazen and those who have 
the means and connections to purchase fraudulent documents.”  Id. at 
1281.  Thus, the 9th Circuit rejected the reasoning of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
6th, and 8th Circuits, and held the immigration judges admission of the 
State Department Letter did not violate the asylum petitioner’s due 




Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) – Union Employee Pay; 
Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport v. United Steel, Paper, & Forestry, Rubber 
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers 
International Union, 734 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2013) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether a company may legally pay the 
full-time salaries of the President and Benefit Representative of the union 
representing the company’s employees” under LMRA § 302.  Id. at 710–
11.  The court noted that the 3rd Circuit determined “that paying the full-
time salaries of the union’s grievance chairmen did not violate Section 
302 of the LMRA because such payments were by reason of the union 
representatives’ former employment,” while the 9th Circuit held “that a 
company could legally pay a union’s full-time [union worker 
representative] where [such representative] was subject to the employer’s 
control and thereby still an employee of the company.”  Id. at 711–12 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also noted that the 2nd 
Circuit, in up-holding a no-docking provision, determined that “an 
employer could not legally pay the full-time salary of a union employee.”  
Id. at 712.  The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 3rd Circuit finding that “an 
employee must receive the compensation or other payment because of 
his or her service for the employer” in order for the by reason of 
“exception” of § 302(c)(1) to encompass the payments.  Id. at 719–20.  
Thus, the 7th Circuit held that the plain language of the § 302(c)(1) 
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exception does not encompass an employer’s “[p]aying the full-time 
union salaries of [the] . . . President and Benefit Representative,” since 
such  “payments are by reason of the union’s President’s and Benefit 
Representative’s service to [its union] members.”  Id. at 712. 
 
 
SECURITIES  LAW 
Securities Act Section 13 – Pleading Requirements; Pension Trust 
Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset Securities 
Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2013) 
The 3rd Circuit considered whether a plaintiff is required “to plead 
with particularity compliance with the applicable statutes of limitations” 
under § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933.  Id. at 270.  The court noted that 
the 1st, 8th, and 10th Circuits have “held that a Securities Act plaintiff 
must plead compliance with Section 13.”  Id.  The court stated that the 
7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits “have recently held that a plaintiff need not 
plead compliance with the statute of limitations in the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”  Id.  The court observed that the 7th Circuit 
rejected the requirement to plead compliance with the statute of 
limitations “because the statute of limitations isn’t even found in the 
statute that creates the substantive right.”  Id. at 270 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit and stated 
“requiring a plaintiff to plead compliance with a statute of limitations 
would effectively ensure that a timelines issue would always appear on 
the face of the complaint, thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiff to 
negate the applicability of the affirmative defense.”  Id. at 271.  Thus, the 
3rd Circuit rejected the position adopted by the 1st, 8th, and 10th, 
Circuits and held “that a Securities Act plaintiff need not plead 








Second Amendment – Domestic Violence Convictions; United States 
v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), was 
constitutional under the Second Amendment.  Id. at 1133.  The court 
noted that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 7th Circuits applied intermediate scrutiny 
to uphold § 922(g)(9), while the 11th Circuit upheld § 922(g)(9) as a 
“presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition” without further 
constitutional analysis.  Id. at 1134–36.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 
1st, 3rd, 4th, and 7th, in adopting a “the two-step Second Amendment 
inquiry,” which considers “first, whether the challenged law imposes a 
burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee,” and second, “applying an appropriate form of means-end 
scrutiny” “if the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within 
the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood . . . .”  Id. 
at 1134, 1136–37.  The court applied the intermediate scrutiny inquiry 
and reasoned, that “by prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants 
from possessing firearms, § 922(g)(9) burdens rights protected by the 
Second Amendment.  Id. at 1137.  The court reasoned further that “the 
government ha[d] met its burden to show that § 922(g)(9)’s prohibition 
on gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially 
related to the important government interest of preventing domestic gun 
violence.”  Id.  at 1141.  Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 
7th Circuits in holding that § 922(g)(9) is substantially related to the 
important government interest of keeping “firearms out of the hands of 
people whose past violence in domestic relationships makes them 
untrustworthy custodians of deadly force.”  Id. at 1139–41. 
 
True Threats – Intent Requirement; United States v. Martinez, 736 
F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2013) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 
(2003) altered the Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) 
framework of true threats “thereby overruling circuit precedent “defining 
true threats according to an objective standard.”  Id. at 986.  The court 
noted that the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits determined that Black did 
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not overrule precedent by introducing a specific-intent-to-threaten 
requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), while the 9th Circuit determined 
that Black requires that the speaker subjectively intended the speech to 
be a threat.  Id. at 985–86.  The 11th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit, 
finding that Black did not import a “requirement of subjective intent into 
all threat-prohibiting statutes,” but rather was more concerned with the 
overbreadth of a specific statute.  Id. at 986–87.  Thus, the 11th Circuit 
joined the 6th Circuit in holding that “Black does not require a 




FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 – Playback Recordings; U.S. v. Monserrate-
Valentin, 729 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2013) 
The 1st Circuit considered whether it is proper for a district court to 
“allow[ ] the playback of certain audio recordings to the jury outside of 
[a criminal defendant’s] presence.”  Id. at 36, 41.  The court noted that 
9th Circuit held that “a defendant has a right to be present when tape-
recorded conversations are replayed to the jury during its deliberations.”  
Id. at 58.  The court also noted that the D.C. Circuit, held that tape 
replaying “was not a stage of trial implicating the confrontation clause or 
Rule 43(a).”  Id.  Thus, the 1st Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in 
holding that a playback of an admitted recording to the jury does not 
violate rule 43 or the defendant’s due process rights as a matter of law.  




Savings Clause – Sentencing Claims; Bryant v. Coleman, 738 F.3d 
1253 (11th Cir. 2013) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(e) “reaches not only an actual-innocence claim, but also [a] 
sentencing claim.”  Id. at 1279.  The court observed that the 2nd, 4th, and 
5th Circuits “limit the reach of the savings clause to actual-innocence 
claims,” while the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits “held that the savings clause 
is available for actual-innocence claims,” but not available for 
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“sentencing claims alleging that the district court misapplied the 
guidelines provisions but imposed a sentence within the statutory 
maximum penalty.”  Id. at 1280.  The court reasoned that the 1st, 6th, 
and 9th Circuits did allow savings clause consideration if the sentence 
exceeded the maximum statutory penalty.  Id.  The court noted that the 
7th Circuit is even more expansive in allowing savings clause claims 
alleging misapplication of sentencing guidelines within the maximum 
statutory penalty.  Id. at 1280–81.  The court further found that the 10th 
Circuit is the most restrictive in not allowing savings clause relief “for 
both actual-innocence claims and all sentencing claims.”  Id. at 1279.  
The court agreed with the 1st, 6th and 9th Circuits in finding that the 
“savings clause applies to sentencing claims because Congress’s use of 
the term ‘detention’ is highly significant to the scope of the savings 
clause.”  Id. at 1281.  The court also noted that “a sentence exceeding the 
authorized statutory maximum . . . is more akin to an actual-innocence 
claim.”  Id. at 1283.  Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that the savings 
clause can be applied to sentence claims alleging the sentence exceeded 
the maximum statutory penalty.  Id. at 1283–84. 
 
